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Abstract In communities of user-generated content,
systems for the management of content and/or their con-
tributors are usually accepted without much protest. Not so,
however, in the case of Wikipedia, in which the proposal to
introduce a system of review for new edits (in order to
counter vandalism) led to heated discussions. This debate is
analysed, and arguments of both supporters and opponents
(of English, German and French tongue) are extracted from
Wikipedian archives. In order to better understand this
division of the minds, an analogy is drawn with theories of
bureaucracy as developed for real-life organizations. From
these it transpires that bureaucratic rules may be perceived
as springing from either a control logic or an enabling
logic. In Wikipedia, then, both perceptions were at work,
depending on the underlying views of participants. Wik-
ipedians either rejected the proposed scheme (because it is
antithetical to their conception of Wikipedia as a commu-
nity) or endorsed it (because it is consonant with their
conception of Wikipedia as an organization with clearly
defined boundaries). Are other open-content communities
susceptible to the same kind of ‘essential contestation’?
Keywords Bureaucracy  Control  Empowerment 
Moderation  Trust  Vandalism  Wikipedia
Introduction
Online communities with user-generated content that invite
everybody to contribute come in various kinds. The term
can refer to initiatives like photograph or video sharing
sites, collective blogs or discussion sites, ‘social news’
sites, ‘citizen journals’, sites for the collective production
of reference works, or—as the archetype of them all—
‘open source software’ (OSS) projects. Such sites draw
together contents ranging from text, images, photographs,
and videos to source code. The cooperation involved ran-
ges from just piling up all contents such as photographs and
videos (‘loose’ collaboration), to working on a collectively
evolving product such as pieces of text and source code
(‘tight’ collaboration); or, in the terminology employed by
Dutton (2008), the focus of ‘collaborative network orga-
nizations’ may range from ‘contributing’ (2.0) to ‘co-cre-
ating’ (3.0).
Inevitably, over time such communities have to intro-
duce rules and regulations to structure interactions. Access
to resources, entitlement to perform activities on them,
and procedures, all have to be specified. Arrangements
ultimately become implemented in software. Such internal
governance employs tools like project architecture, for-
malization, division of roles, and rules for decision making
(for OSS specifically cf. de Laat 2007). An important area
is the management of incoming content and of participants
who contribute. The terms for accepting and ‘processing’
content have to be agreed. This may involve a process of
moderation: judgment of content, either by specific role
occupants (‘moderators’) appointed to exercise such pow-
ers (‘moderation proper’), or by all users of the community
(‘self-moderation’). Such moderation may be exercised
after content has become public, or (also) before. In addi-
tion, contributors themselves may have to be monitored
and disciplined by specified role occupants. This area of
governance is obviously central to the functioning of any
community and may therefore, on the face of it, evoke
strong feelings and opinions, both in favour and against.
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However, the management arrangements adopted usually
seem to be accepted without much questioning, right from
the start of such communities.
Examples readily come to mind. As far as ‘contributing’
2.0 communities are concerned, on Skinhead Forum, a blog
for purported skinheads (now defunct), discussants contin-
uously patrolled and scrutinized each other in order to
uphold the ‘authentic’ skinhead identity. Transgressors of
these boundaries were reprimanded and flamed. Ultimately
the blog’s appointed ‘moderators’ could censor their posts
or expel them altogether (Anahita 2006). Slashdot, a news
site about technology-related matters (for ‘nerds’), solicits
topics for discussion and comments on them from the
crowd. Site editors first filter incoming topics—before
publication. After publication they continuously scout
comments for inappropriate or illegal content and deal with
it; the contributors involved are warned or banned from the
site by them. Moreover, comments are moderated as to
whether they are constructive (a plus vote) or not (a minus
vote). Apart from the professional site editors, these rights
to moderate comments are distributed to ‘average and
positive’, registered Slashdot contributors by a random
process (for a limited amount of moderation points). The
privilege thus rotates over the Slashdot population as a
whole. Users who are perceived as abusing their powers of
moderation are removed from the moderator eligibility pool
(Poor 2005; http://slashdot.org/faq).1 In Reddit, a social
news site, registered users may submit news stories (as link,
or summary text, or both) for subsequent discussion in the
general ‘reddit’ or in specific ‘subreddits’. As a quality
rating system, participants may vote on whether news items
and/or comments are helpful or not. The sum total of these
up votes (?1) and down votes (-1)—and how recent a
contribution is—determines the order in which items and
comments appear on their respective front pages. As in
Slashdot, the editorial team monitors for off-topic, inap-
propriate, or illegal content and takes action (deletion of
content and/or banning users) accordingly. ‘Moderators’
(initiators of subreddits being automatically appointed as
such) may do likewise (http://www.reddit.com).
‘Co-creative’ 3.0 communities usually seem to accept
such arrangements for managing content and/or contribu-
tors as well. In Citizendium, an ‘open source’ encyclope-
dia, comments from all (once registered as ‘author’) on the
site’s entries are welcome (wiki format). Collegial ‘editors’
(appointed by the editor-in-chief) exercise ‘gentle over-
sight’ over their development and finally may award the
status of ‘approved’ article. If necessary, abusive users are
expelled from the site by a ‘constable’, who is appointed
after public consultation (de Laat 2012). In communities of
OSS, moderation is applied prior to ‘publication’. Com-
monly a division of roles obtains, typically of project
owner–developers–observers. It is only up to developers
(and beyond) to contribute to the source code tree—either
their own code, or code suggested by observers that has
passed the test of scrutiny. Contributors with unhelpful—
let alone disruptive—suggestions not only do not obtain
developer status, they are also simply ignored (de Laat
2010).
As may be expected, in many individual instances com-
ments, interventions and/or disciplining decisions evoke
strong reactions from the participants involved. Nobody par-
ticularly likes to be ignored, corrected, overruled, flamed,
ostracized, or punished. But the point I want to make is a
different one: while particular outcomes of a system may be
contested, the system as such does not seem to be in dispute in
the cases described above. Their users seem to consent that the
particular system adopted is legitimate. This observation
applies regardless of whether the moderation systems
employed were more hierarchical (as to a small extent in
Slashdot and to a great extent in OSS) or more egalitarian (all
others). It would seem, moreover, that the moderation systems
involved were in place right from the start of these ventures.
Some were slightly refined and tweaked thereafter (Slashdot
in particular; cf. Poor 2005), but the basics of their setup have
remained intact. According to my observations, right from the
beginning until the present day, their legitimacy has not been
questioned.2 So, as a general rule, users’ consent for systems
of moderation and contributor management has been contin-
uous, right from the beginning up to the present day.
This article focuses on an intriguing exception to this
rule: in Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia par excellence,
over the years an editorial policy had evolved of equal wiki
access for all, without specific moderators, taking a ‘wik-
iquette’ into account, though with ‘administrators’ being
entitled to execute punitive actions (cf. Stvilia et al. 2008;
de Laat 2010). This policy had been accepted without
much protest. Then, recently, the first steps on the path of
moderation proper were taken: a specific proposal to
introduce a system of reviewing edits before they appear on
screen (aka ‘flagged revisions’). The new proposal led to a
remarkable division of views: some embrace it, others
denounce and reject it in equally vigorous terms.
Remarkably, this sharp division is reproduced across
several language versions of Wikipedia (although the
extent of adherence to one stance or the other varies). An
actual split up of some of the language communities (the
English in particular) over this issue cannot be ruled out. It
1 All websites mentioned in the text and the references were last
accessed on 24 January 2012.
2 This statement could be verified for all open-content communities
mentioned above—except for Skinhead Forum. In 2010 its founder,
Richard Barrett, was killed by a neighbour. The site (http://www.
skinheadz.com) is now therefore defunct and can no longer be
inspected.
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is this review proposal that forms the central topic of this
article.
My approach is as follows. Discussions, debates, and
polls about (varieties of) the scheme in the three largest
Wikipedia language versions (English, German and
French) are analysed. The main arguments pro and con are
extracted from the Wikipedian archives—and shown to be
roughly similar across Wikipedians speaking the English,
German or French language. Proponents argue that the
scheme is a welcome tool to combat vandalism, while their
opponents maintain that the original egalitarian conception
of Wikipedia is sacrificed, with bureaucracy increasing.
These contrasting ‘definitions of the situation’ are then
analysed by a comparison with real-life organizations—
which enables us to interpret the proponents’ perception of
the scheme as springing from an enabling logic, and the
opponents’ perception of the scheme as emanating from a
control logic. Finally, I speculate about the reasons behind
this unusual spectacle of an ‘essentially contested’ system
of moderation. Basically, two equally consistent visions are
pitted against each other: Wikipedia as a reliable, ency-
clopedic institution on the hand, and Wikipedia as a soli-
dary community on the other. This immediately raises the
further question of whether such contrasting visions also
exist in other open-content communities.
Wikipedian governance
Editorial policy within Wikipedia is still very similar to the
way it started a decade ago: all users (called ‘editors’),
anonymous or not, may change existing entries and provide
comments (on an associated ‘talk page’). Any changes are
immediately effectuated in the entry (as it appears in a
‘wiki’). Upon registration with a user name, users may also
create new entries. While an entry evolves over time, users
have to sort it out between themselves; they moderate
among themselves, no specific moderators are appointed.
After this egalitarian setup had been put into operation,
Wikipedians very soon discovered to their dismay that
‘disruptive behaviour’ was not to be ruled out. One variety of
such behaviour is directed against the entries themselves:
so-called ‘vandals’ take pleasure in disfiguring pages in ways
ranging from subtle to vulgar. Another variety takes aim at
their co-contributors: they are abused, harassed and/or
threatened (on talk pages, by email, and the like). In
response, two initiatives unfolded. For one thing, Wikipe-
dian ‘etiquette’ was formulated, emphasizing good faith,
civility, warmth, and forgiveness. For another, disciplining
roles were introduced to keep abuses in check: ‘administra-
tors’—appointed by ‘bureaucrats’. Administrators primarily
freeze disputed pages for a while (‘page protection’) or
delete them altogether. In addition, they may ban specific,
troublesome users from editing for a while (‘blocking’
users).
In spite of these measures, vandalism very much con-
tinued to plague Wikipedia. In general, anonymous users
turn out to be more prone to vandalism than registered
users. As a result, of the total number of vandalising edits
(around 4% of all edits), most (97%) are produced by
anonymous users.3 In order to meet these worries and
enhance the encyclopedia’s reliability, several initiatives
are unfolding. Software bots, specifically coded for the
occasion, are allowed to scan and patrol entries 24 h a day.
Moreover, WikiProjects are formed that mobilize users
having a focus on specific areas; relevant entries are taken
into custody in order to foster improvements. A quality
grading procedure is part of this initiative. Finally, the
WikiTrust extension (available for Mozilla Firefox only)
has been developed that colours sentences of an entry
according to the time they have survived intact within the
encyclopedia. The darker their colour, the younger the text
is, and—so the assumption goes—the less reliability a user
may impute to the text.
Also, in a more radical vein, schemes are being
contemplated that constitute a change to editorial practices
themselves—not just increasing vigilance to the quality of
textual entries as they evolve. The scheme, which is the
subject proper of this article, proposes to review new edits
coming in for evidence of vandalism; only after this check
do they become ‘official’. While this is the basic idea,
several parameters are still open to various implementa-
tions. Is review to apply only to specific entries that are
vulnerable to vandalism (like biographies of living per-
sons), or to all entries? Which are the identifying signs of
‘obvious vandalism’? Who are to be entitled to review new
edits? Whose edits are to be checked: only anonymous
users, only inexperienced users, or all users? And which
version of an entry is shown to unregistered users as the
default: the most recent version (as is current practice), or
indeed the latest reviewed version (which supposedly dis-
courages potential vandals by barring immediate gratifi-
cation for performing a vandalistic edit)?
System of review: procedure
Before recounting which specific configurations of the
review system actually crystallised in practice, I first briefly
describe the consultation procedures on the scheme as they
were performed in various language versions of Wikipedia.
3 These statistics refer to the English Wikipedia over the years
2004–2006; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_
Vandalism_studies/Study1. A general review of studies of vandalism
on Wikipedia is given in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
WikiProject_Vandalism_studies.
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I shall focus on the three largest Wikipedias: English,
German and French. It all began in German circles. From
2006 onwards users discussed all possible technicalities of
the reviewing system (such as the criteria for becoming a
reviewer, criteria for being exempt from review, waiting
times of pending edits, and the like). Subsequently, Ger-
man programmers wrote implementing software4 which
was tested and tried for 3 months (from May 2008
onwards). The configuration chosen may aptly be referred
to as the ‘German system’ (see below). A poll was held
subsequently to determine whether to continue or not. A
vivid debate ensued. Ultimately, some 55% voted in favour
(the outcome of a rather confusing voting procedure).5 As a
result, the system has remained ‘switched on’ ever since.6
In the English Wikipedia the debate was more pro-
tracted. Proponents and opponents were both very vocal,
and voiced their concerns incessantly over several years.
As the two camps were almost equal in strength, the debate
was very protracted. Several polls were held, but the
deadlock could not be broken. Decisions were constantly
postponed. Only in 2010 could a 2-month trial be agreed
upon (with 60% in support).7 The configuration chosen,
which I refer to as the ‘English system’ (see below), is
considerably less stringent than the German one. After the
trial (July–August 2010), a majority (about 60%) voted in
favour of keeping the system turned on until updated
software became available.8 At the end of May 2011 the
system was finally turned off (with 66% in favour)9 in
order to clear the air for further discussion about whether
and how to apply the review system.
The French debate, in comparison, was the most orderly
of all. Users discussed the various schemes over the years.
Ultimately, in 2009, they decided to take a vote on both the
English and the German system—there being no need for
them, apparently, to invent a French system. After a heated
argument, both options were rejected: 56% voted against
the English system, 78% against the German system.10
Systems of review have disappeared from view ever since.
System of review: the rules
As recounted above, all possible configurations of such a
reviewing system ultimately narrowed down to two specific
options: the German and the English system. Let me first
explain the German system as it is the most elaborate and
most extensively tried system of the two (http://de.wikip
edia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:GSV). The term employed in
German for the reviewing process is Sichten (literally: to sift,
to sight); versions that have been reviewed are called ges-
ichtete Versionen (sighted versions); users performing the
review are denoted as Sichter. All new edits are to be
checked, whether or not they involve entries that are sensi-
tive to vandalism. Users who desire to obtain Sichterrechte
(rights of sighting) must be registered, have been active for at
least 60 days, and have performed at least 300 edits (or 200
gesichtete, i.e., sighted, edits)—note that these are the same
criteria for users to obtain the right to vote within Wikipedia.
Over time, users may automatically become exempt from the
requirement that their own edits need to be reviewed (passive
Sichterstatus; i.e., rights of ‘auto-review’): at least 30 days
of activity and 150 performed edits (or 50 gesichtete edits)
are the criteria. Unregistered users, by default, get to see the
latest reviewed version (although the most recent version is
just one mouse click away). For registered users, the current
practice of showing the latest version is continued.
According to the relevant German statistics, ungesichtete
Versionen (unsighted versions) on average may have to wait
5–6 days before being cleared.11
The English system, which was adopted much later (July
2010–May 2011), employed its own Wikipedian termi-
nology as well. Here, versions with new edits were put on
hold, waiting to be reviewed (‘patrolled’)—if a reviewer
4 The software extension, called FlaggedRevs, has been developed by
Aaron Schultz and Jo¨rg Baach, and was released under an open source
license, the GPL (see http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:
FlaggedRevs).
5 Votes were as follows: 708 in favour of the system with the ‘sighted
version’ as default, 197 in favour of the system with the most recent
version as default, 362 against the system, 33 neutral, with 129
rejecting the vote on procedural grounds. Precise references for these
poll outcomes (and the ones that follow) can be obtained from the
author upon request.
6 Several other language versions subsequently followed suit.
Confining myself to those with over 100,000 entries: the Russian,
Chinese, Hungarian, Polish, and Esperanto versions in 2008, the
Indonesian version in 2010, and the Turkish version in 2011.
7 Votes were divided as follows: 429 in support, 282 in opposition,
and 9 neutral.
8 This decision took two rounds of voting. The first vote on
continuation of the system had the following outcome: 407 in favour,
217 against, and 44 other responses. Since a 2/3 majority (‘consen-
sus’) was not achieved, another vote (with more restricted wording)
was organized: 289 for temporary continuation, 199 against, and 40
opposing the poll on procedural grounds.
9 As the final part of a discussion about turning off the feature, a vote
was taken: 127 in favour, 65 opposed.
10 Poll results were as follows: the English system collected 31 votes
against, 15 in favour, and 9 neutral; the German system 46 votes
against, 12 in favour, and 1 neutral.
11 I have chosen to stick to the terms employed in the German
Wikipedia and not translate them. This choice may appear cumber-
some to the reader, but it has the advantage that terms remain
unambiguous and can easily be differentiated from the slightly
different system proposed in the English Wikipedia (see below). Note
that the Wikipedians involved themselves have also been struggling
with this issue of translation.
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found them free of vandalism (s)he flagged them as a sign
of approval (‘flagged revisions’, FRs). The newly proposed
edits that were still uncensored were denominated ‘pending
changes’ (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:FLR;
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:PC). This
English review system of flagged revisions did not apply
across the board to all entries. Only specific entries that
were deemed to be susceptible to vandalism (like biogra-
phies of living persons—say Janet Reno or Stephen Fry)
were possible candidates. The rationale was that FRs are
meant to be an intermediate measure between protection of
an entry (either full protection: no one may perform edits,
or semi-protection: only experienced users may edit) on the
one hand, and no protection at all on the other. FRs allow
editing to continue—under increased vigilance. In keeping
with this idea, an entry only received such ‘flagged pro-
tection’ upon request. Over 1,000 entries actually enjoyed
this protection during the trial. Reportedly, pending chan-
ges were routinely dealt with in a few hours.
Rights of participation in the system were not awarded
in some automatic manner. Users had to apply formally to
the administrators and show some Wikipedian experience.
Rights of review were granted if performed edits numbered
over 100 and the applicant’s past behaviour was impec-
cable (no vandalism, no harassment, and the like).
Exemption from review (rights of so-called ‘auto-patrol’ or
‘auto-review’) was granted if one had contributed some 50
‘sound’ articles to the encyclopedia. As in the German
system, unregistered users got to see the latest patrolled
version by default—all others were still presented with the
latest version.
System of review: pros and cons
All across the three largest Wikipedias this review system
(of one variety or another) has been the subject of intense
debate.12 Arguments in favour were championed just as
passionately as arguments against. Which arguments were
adduced? I scrutinized Wikipedian archives for all talk
pages, discussion pages, petitions, (straw) polls, requests
for comments, and the like related to this issue, in the
English, German and French language versions. The group
of English participants was the largest, numbering several
hundreds who voiced their opinions. From these sources I
was able to extract the following arguments, which turned
out to be basically similar, whether one happened to speak
English, German, or French.13
To begin with, the precise procedure that was followed
in arguing and deciding about a reviewing system has
evoked many comments, over the years. This is only to be
expected because (democratic) procedure in Wikipedia is
still a rather fuzzy area. Several parameters of the review
system were under discussion simultaneously (such as its
scope, the granting of rights of review, and of auto-review).
How should such a debate, in cyberspace, about a number
of competing alternatives be handled? Asking participants
to vote is easy enough. But then the more difficult question
imposes itself of how large the majority of votes should be
to take a decision? Discussions on heated topics have a
tendency to go on indefinitely. On which grounds (if any) is
it permissible to declare a debate closed? In both German
and English Wikipedia, trials were held that lasted a
number of months (see above). In both cases, a debate
ensued at the end of the trial period about whether or not to
continue the trial. If the debate is strenuous and takes time
(which the English case in particular did), does the trial
have to be stopped in the meantime or not? All discussions
on content were shot through with such procedural mis-
givings. And of course, procedural arguments were mainly
voiced by opponents who felt threatened by the possible
introduction of the review system.
Leaving such procedural arguments aside, I now turn to
an analysis of the substantive arguments brought up in the
discussion. The argument in favour was invariably that a
review system would facilitate a more effective fight
against vandalism. The reliability of Wikipedia was seen to
be at stake.
This could significantly improve Wikipedia. In my
experience, the vast majority of IP edits are not
constructive, and I think that removing the possibility
of ‘instant gratification’ for vandals would dramati-
cally reduce the appeal of vandalism. (English user,
2009)
So, the slogan should be rewritten to Wikipedia: The
free encyclopaedia that anyone who behaves can edit.
So, who will be affected by flagged revisions? Those
that we smack around already anyway. If you add
libel to the project, we ride your ass. If you vandalize,
we ride your ass. And if you behave, you quickly
enough get the opportunity to flag revisions yourself.
(English user, 2009)14
12 Note, as observed above, that while the German discussion centred
on the ‘German system’ and the English discussion on the ‘English
system’, French Wikipedians confined their discussions to these two
existing forms and never developed their ‘own’ variety of the review
system.
13 For reasons of space, no references to user quotations are provided
in this article. All due care has been taken to quote in a precise
manner, however. The full list of references (from English, German
and French Wikipedia) is obtainable from the author on request.
14 Similarly in German: ‘‘Dringend notwendig zur Steigerung der
Qualita¨t und Beka¨mpfung von Vandalismus. Unser Ziel ist die
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An additional argument for the English system in particular
was that FRs create an additional option between no
protection and (semi-)protection of entries, which allows
editing to continue.
This was the one and only argument, repeated by all
who championed the review system. Arguments from the
opponents were more ramified. For one thing, they
expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the scheme. As
some remarked, ‘obvious vandalism’ does not need a
special system: precisely because such edits are obvious,
normal Wikipedian users will routinely correct or ignore
them. Moreover, a review system may considerably delay
the publication of edits. Do we have enough reviewers to
take care of pending edits in a reasonable time? Fears of
clogging the pipeline for months were expressed repeat-
edly. In addition, the system was felt to be extremely
complex; the fine details of its operation led to confusion
and misunderstandings.
The major practical objection, however, was that the
system would misfire and produce unwanted side effects.
While vandals may possibly be diverted, at the same time
bona fide, anonymous users (constituting the large majority
of anonymous users) would simply be chased away because
they do not see their edits appear immediately on the screen.
(..) it would be frustrating to go to an encyclopedia
that ‘‘anyone can edit,’’ come to a page, make an edit,
and then have that edit not show up until some Admin
can be bothered to roll over that way and approve it.
(English user, 2009)15
An important pool of useful editors would be depleted:
In my opinion, a fit analogy for implementing this
widely is ‘‘sawing off the branch one is sitting on’’…
(English user, 2009)
Apart from such practical considerations, the reviewing
system was also—and mainly—condemned on reasons of
principle. A number of such objections came to be
expressed. To begin with, it was interpreted as adding a
layer of bureaucracy.
Just another layer of un-needed bureaucracy. (English
user, 2010)
This idea is just added bureaucracy to a process of
editing that works well already, and with all the sug-
gestions for how the ‘reviewer’ permissions would
work, along with all of the exceptions and additions,
seems overly-complicated for new users, and just a
power-trip for those granted additional permissions
and responsibilities. (English user, 2009)16
Moreover, it was seen as representing yet another layer of
bureaucratic machinery, on top of one already in existence.
The growing surplus of bureaucracy in a volunteer
undertaking such as Wikipedia was experienced as
extremely aggravating and frustrating.
Wikipedia is already groaning under the weight of all
the self-appointed critics on private ego trips, who
restrict their activity to flagging articles and chiding
the overworked and patient bona-fide editors. Why
should we be providing an official niche for people
who view the project as a way of fulfilling their
power fantasies? (English user, 2009)
This has since developed, or I would say degenerated,
into an increasingly complex bureaucratic jungle, of
which this proposal is the latest step in the wrong
direction. This proposal is so enormously complex
that repeatedly in the discussions, supporters are
pointing out that other editors have misunderstood
some intricate details etc. Very worrisome, if editors
that have the Wikipedia-knowledge to find this poll
page in the haystack have so many problems under-
standing and appreciating what is really meant by the
proposal. (English user, 2009)
Most prominent of all, however, was the objection that the
proposed rules of review reflect a wrong attitude: they
depart from the assumption that contributors of new edits
are not to be trusted a priori. Their edits therefore have to
be censored.
Wikipedia has always worked on a basis of trust, we
have always said that being an admin is nothing
special and most importantly it’s an encyclopaedia
that anyone can edit. Flagged revisions says you can
edit but your edit can’t be seen we don’t trust you. It
places importance on having tools creating an
importance that shouldn’t be there. The worse thing is
Footnote 14 continued
Erstellung einer Enzyklopa¨die.’’ (German user, 2008); and in French:
‘‘Pour avoir vu le syste`me a` l’œuvre sur de: Permet de laisser le
syste`me ouvert a` tous, en freinant se´rieusement l’inte´reˆt du vandal-
isme.’’ (French user, 2009)
15 Similarly in German: ‘‘Dass man als IP verwirrt wird, da man
seine A¨nderungen nicht sieht, empfinde ich als fatal. Wer wu¨rde sich
dadurch nicht abschrecken lassen, wenn einem zuna¨chst gesagt wird,
dass man hier frei mitarbeiten kann, die eigenen A¨nderungen aber
nicht angezeigt werden? Es werden massiv Autoren demotiviert und
abspringen.’’ (German user, 2008); and in French: ‘‘Cette feature me
semble eˆtre une tre`s mauvaise ide´e. Tout l’inte´reˆt de Wikipe´dia est
justement que les IPs peuvent e´diter. Que tre`s facilement quelqu’un
puisse s’investir facilement. Alors, aujourd’hui, re´ussir a` s’inte´grer est
plus dur qu’auparavant (nombreuses re`gles, etc.), si en plus on ajoute
que les modifications doivent eˆtre valide´e…’’ (French user, 2008)
16 Similarly in German: ‘‘Das Ganze ist nur wieder ein zusa¨tzlicher
Bu¨rokratismus.’’ (German user, 2008); and in French: ‘‘Donne
beaucoup de travail en plus pour valider les re´visions, et c¸a nous
e´loigne du concept de Wikipe´dia. C¸a ne va pas.’’ (French user, 2009)
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flagged revisions makes the presumption that all edits
are malicious and increases the power of POV
pushers/Cabals to control article content. In all of this
people appear to be loosing [sic] sight of the char-
acteristics that made Wikipedia what it is. (English
user, 2009)
Why should rollbackers, administrators, and bots get
to say that they don’t trust editors who are established
users and not vandals, or IP users who are making
good edits? (English user, 2009)17
As a result, Wikipedia becomes a society of two classes of
users, with experienced users lording it over inexperienced
ones.
We don’t want to go down the road where an elite
group of ‘‘reviewers’’ decides what an open encyclo-
pedia should include. (English user, 2010)
Wikipedia does not need yet another class of editors
privileged over ordinary editors. (English user, 2010)18
One commentator went one step further by asking the
perennial question: who is to control the controllers?
Vandalism is not that big a problem that we need to
censor all editors until the usual suspects who are sup-
posedly ‘‘trusted’’ come and look at our edits. Will these
‘‘trusted’’ editors all be experts in the subjects they are
censoring? How do we know? Who monitors the ability
and/or competence of these ‘‘trusted’’ people? Who
decides that they are trusted? (English user, 2009)
Finally, all these features were repeatedly denounced as a
clear violation of the original egalitarian principles of
Wikipedia, the encyclopedia-that-anyone-can-edit.
This proposal goes against the very idea of Wikipe-
dia. We are an encyclopedia open to the public, and
an encyclopedia that can be edited by the public, at
will; this proposal will restrict that and is a dangerous
idea. (English user, 2009)
[I] oppose all measures that contradict the founding
principle that Wikipedia is an encyclopedia anyone
can edit. (English user, 2010)19
Theories of bureaucracy
So, basically, what we are witnessing here is a clash
between two diametrically opposed interpretations: ‘flag-
ged revisions’ (or ‘gesichtete Versionen’) as a useful tool
for curbing vandalism versus as a superfluous bureaucratic
device that violates egalitarian principles of participation.
It would seem useful to probe into the deeper origins of this
clash. I shall do so by developing an analogy with orga-
nizations which, in ‘real life’, have been introducing rules
and regulations for ages. Organization science has, in
conjunction, been trying to develop a systematic perspec-
tive on these issues: theories of bureaucracy.
The main line has been reviving the Weberian analysis of
bureaucracy. Some milestones are Gouldner (1955), who
distinguished between a punishment-centred and a repre-
sentative bureaucracy, and Burns and Stalker (1961) with
their famous contrast between a mechanistic and an organic
regime. It was up to Fox (1974) to integrate these various
approaches around the concept of discretion—the extent to
which organizational participants may exercise their own
wisdom and judgment in performing their tasks. He proposed
a pair of contrasting work role patterns, on either side of a
continuum. At one end of the scale, the ‘low-discretion
syndrome’ is characterized by an elaborate division of roles
(with minimal discretion for the lower echelons), formal-
ization, and centralization of decision-making powers. At the
other end of the scale, the ‘high-discretion syndrome’ con-
stitutes the opposite: a minimal division of roles, low for-
malization, and decentralized decision making.
Subsequently, Fox developed a trust dynamics of orga-
nizational moves towards one or the other end of this
continuum (Fox 1974: chapter 2). If an organization moves
towards its lower end, it expresses declining trust in their
contributors in carrying out their tasks. Lowering discretion
is a sign of distrust; as a consequence, employees may be
expected to reciprocate with a decline in trust towards
management. A classic example (in Fox’s interpretation) is
the gypsum plant that figured as the centrepiece of analysis
in Gouldner (1955): operating rules came to be enforced
and freedom of movement forbidden.20 On the other hand,
if the organizational syndrome moves toward granting
more discretion, then this expresses rising trust of the
employees. Recipients are invited to reciprocate likewise.
17 Similarly in German: ‘‘(…) Edits (of unregistered users) werden
aus einer allgemeinen Misstrauenshaltung heraus zu Edits zweiter
Klasse, also nicht vero¨ffentlichenswert deklariert, bis eben mal ein
Sichter daherkommt, sich erbarmt und diese freischaltet.’’ (German
user, 2008); and in French: ‘‘Il s’agit purement et simplement d’une
forme de censure.’’ (French user, 2009)
18 Similarly in German: ‘‘Um etwas Vandalismus zu verhindern wird
nun bewusst eine 2 Klassen Gesellschaft in Kauf genommen.’’
(German user, 2008); and in French: ‘‘Les flagged revisions marquent
de facto la se´paration entre e´diteurs et lecteurs.’’ (French user, 2009)
19 Similarly in German: ‘‘Mit dieser Sichterei verleugnet die
Wikipedia das Wikiprinzip. Nicht mehr: jeder kann mitschreiben,
sondern jetzt: jeder kann Vorschla¨ge einsenden. Das ist nicht mehr die
Footnote 19 continued
Wikipedia, wie sie sich urspru¨nglich definiert.’’ (German user, 2008);
and in French: ‘‘Du point de vue ide´ologique, ce genre d’ame´lioration
me parait aller a` l’encontre de l’ide´e originelle qui m’a se´duite
(participation de toutes et tous sans distinction).’’ (French user, 2009)
20 Its workers staged a wildcat strike precisely because of these low-
trust moves (as analysed by the same Gouldner in Wildcat Strike
10 years later).
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Bureaucratic rules, then, may be seen to emanate from a
control logic. While this has remained the main line of
analysis (up to the present), some decades later Adler and
Borys (1996) alerted us to the possibilities of another kind
of logic: an enabling logic. Bureaucratic rules may also be
designed in order to enable employees to better master their
tasks, by providing them with the professional tools to do
so. Equipment may become designed with usability and
upgrading in mind, enhancing users’ capabilities and
leveraging their skills. Transparency of the broader system
and flexibility for users are key aspects of such design. The
showpiece of enabling logic presented by the co-authors is
the Xerox company, which developed a new line of pho-
tocopiers in an on-going dialogue among users, designers,
and business decision makers. They were specifically
designed from the premises that the systems should
‘mobilize rather than replace users’ intelligence’ (Adler
and Borys 1996: p. 68). Similarly, formal procedures may
come to represent organizational memory and allow orga-
nizational contingencies to be better dealt with. As a result,
workers become empowered to better execute their tasks.
This alternative logic, I presume, can easily be folded
into the above Foxian dynamics of trust. The introduction
of enabling rules expresses faith in employees’ capabilities.
Whether discretion increases (equipment design) or possi-
bly decreases (formal procedure), in all circumstances their
discretion is ‘enriched’ by providing the tools for a more
professional execution of tasks. As a result, employees’
trust can only increase. On the other hand, failure on the
part of management to take such enabling potentialities
into account expresses a lack of faith in employees’
potentialities; correspondingly, employee trust towards
management can only stagnate or decline.
As can be seen, the two types of ‘bureaucratic’ trust
dynamics can easily be combined. The introduction of rules
that are seen to emanate from a control logic (thus reducing
discretion), and/or the failure to attend to the introduction of
rules that are interpreted as enabling (thus neglecting any
potential ‘enrichment’ of discretion) tend to diminish mutual
trust between employees and management. On the other
hand, disregarding/eliminating rules of control (thus wid-
ening discretion) and/or introducing rules of empowerment
(thus ‘enriching’ discretion) have the potential to increase
this trust on the sides of both employees and management.21
Let me stress that in the analysis above, (similar kinds
of) rules and regulations are the subject of unequivocal
interpretation; they are perceived as either controlling or
enabling, depending on their make-up. A strict division of
labour is perceived as control; a transparent procedure for
self-help repair of equipment is perceived as empowering.
In rare instances, reports can be found about the same kind
of rules being perceived as either the one or the other,
depending on circumstances. Take Sitkin & George (2005),
who analysed the introduction of formal criteria for taking
decisions about firing or medical cost: they were shown to
weaken or enhance managerial legitimacy, depending on
context. In particular, they argued that under external
threats, formal criteria could acquire a connotation of
fairness.22 But that is as far as it goes. To my knowledge,
no organizational analysis claims that a particular kind of
rule may be perceived as both in the same context: i.e., a
sizeable number of participants perceive them as control-
ling, while an equally sizeable number take the opposite
stance and define them as empowering. No wonder,
because that would run totally counter to the overall tenor
of the analysis in terms of (enriched) discretion as a gesture
of trust towards participants.
Communities of user-generated content
and bureaucracy
Returning to communities of user-generated content, I
propose that a similar kind of bureaucratic analysis can be
applied. How can this claim be substantiated? I would
argue that in such communities, just as in organizations, a
hierarchy obtains. These hierarchical relations have the
following origin. Site owners—usually joined by the
occupants of several roles which they distinguish, have
regulatory powers that are embedded in the community’s
virtual design. As a result, users who volunteer to partici-
pate may obviously choose their tasks, but for their par-
ticipation to come into effect they have to request access to
relevant files, apply for visitor and/or write access, all the
while respecting certain tools and procedures for partici-
pation. If volunteers play by these rules their contributions
are welcome; otherwise they are ignored or even banned
from the community. Note that the hierarchy that obtains
does not revolve around participants receiving pay in
exchange for contributing (as in organizations) but about
21 Note that a similar kind of conclusion stems from the analysis of
inter-organizational relationships (Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005;
Mellewigt et al. 2007). Parties usually draft contracts to regulate
their cooperation. It is found that the clauses involved may spring
from two logics. On the one hand, predictably, they may act as a
control mechanism (to substitute for a mutual trust that is absent); on
the other hand, and more surprisingly, if trust obtains, they may help
to further cooperation by specifying mutual goals and drafting
procedures for dealing with economic or technical contingencies (the
contract ‘complements’ trust). As a result, contracting does not
Footnote 21 continued
necessarily chase away trust; it may also underscore and enhance
mutual trust.
22 Note that these authors studied formal rules unrelated to discre-
tion. Such rules are, I suppose, more amenable to multiple interpre-
tations than discretion-related rules.
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acquiring esteem. Participants do not risk being fired, but
they can be ignored or evicted.
In view of this hierarchy nexus, a close correspondence
obtains between organizations on the one hand and open-
content communities on the other.23 Consequently, the
above bureaucratic analysis may also be assumed to apply to
such communities.24 In particular, the governance rules
employed can be perceived to spring from two kinds of logic:
either a control logic or an enabling logic. This applies in
particular to the subarea under consideration here: manage-
ment of content and disciplining contributors. Editorial
policies, conflict rules, conflict procedure, rule enforcement,
all of these have to navigate the waters of control versus
empowerment. Since community owners are massively
dependent on their community members and are hardly in a
position to impose any rules against their will (lest many of
them desert), as a rule it will—and only can—be collective
discussions inside the community crystallizing into a col-
lective outcome that drive the emergence of governance
arrangements and their subsequent implementation in code.
As observed above, content and contributor management
systems within such communities usually seem to be
accepted without question. In the terms of our bureaucratic
analysis, this would seem to be a case of systems being
accepted as they are interpreted as enabling. In which sense,
then, can members be said to experience feelings of
empowerment? What kind of activities are being furthered
and strengthened? My answer is that participants endorse a
certain amount of content management and ‘policing’ since
these enable them to experience and contribute to a vibrant
community in which the quality of content is high and
unwanted disturbances are kept to a minimum. Compare the
communities mentioned in the introduction: Skinheads may
rest assured that their identity is being upheld, Slashdotters
are spared unconstructive posts, Reddit readers can be sure
not to miss the most interesting comments, Citizendium users
have a guaranteed, expert-vetted experience, and participants
in an OSS project can be sure that the quality of the source
code tree is scrupulously guarded by their project leader.
But now consider Wikipedia. Until recently, editorial
policies (of equal access, no moderators, observance of
Wikipedian etiquette, policing by administrators) had
enjoyed broad acceptance. In line with the foregoing
analysis, Wikipedians endorsed this gentle policy as
enabling Wikipedia to contain disturbances, which
inevitably turned up from time to time. The proposed
extension of this policy with a system of review, however,
showed a marked deviation from this path of broad
acceptance. As shown above, it led to both vehement
consent and vehement dissent, with only a few adopting an
intermediate position. Can this anomalous finding be rec-
onciled with the analysis of bureaucratic rules (as devel-
oped above by analogy with the organization
phenomenon)? Which kind of logic(s) may be said to
apply, and if so, how and why? Can our bureaucratic
analysis be saved, possibly in adapted form, or does it have
to be abandoned?
The proposition I develop is that the analysis is still
appropriate—though in modified form. This modification is
necessary as a community has fuzzier boundaries than the
more solid boundaries of an organization. As a result,
Wikipedians could entertain different background visions
of what kind of community Wikipedia should represent.
These different visions produced a difference in apprecia-
tion. To put it in a nutshell: many of those who reject the
system of review do so from a vision of Wikipedia as an
unbounded community that shares knowledge without
mutual control and suspicion, while many of those who
embrace the review system do so because they have a
vision of Wikipedia as an organization producing reliable
knowledge that keeps vandalism outside its borders. I shall
elaborate on this statement by looking back at the results
above on the reception of the review system and citing
some more participants from the ongoing discussions.
Proponents look on the review system as a further
strengthening of anti-vandalism policies already in place. It
is cast as an additional tool filling the rather large gap
between no protection and full protection. So, to them,
endorsement is no big deal, it is seen as enabling a routinely
continuation of a disturbance-free Wikipedian experience. It
is also stressed that the new system is absolutely necessary to
keep rising vandalism at bay—only when armed with it will
users keep faith in Wikipedia as a sound undertaking.
Underlying this perception as an enabling logic, two
interesting preoccupations can be observed. For one thing,
many supporters of this position show themselves to be
preoccupied with the reputation of Wikipedia as a reliable
encyclopedia. They refer to ‘‘Wikipedia as a respected
encyclopedia’’, ‘‘our reputation as an encyclopedia’’, a
‘‘world-class high quality reference work’’, ‘‘Fo¨rderung
von Informations-Qualita¨t’’, and ‘‘notorie´te´ de Wikipedia’’.
In conjunction, some users express concern that the lack of
reliability may harm people:
We currently have the potential to do great harm to
people, corporations and organizations through our
popularity as the world’s 4th most visited website. By
allowing anyone to edit, we’ve been complicit in
23 Observe that Dutton (2008), on the basis of a series of empirical
case studies, essentially comes to similar conclusions.
24 A similar bureaucratic analysis has fruitfully been performed
before, concerning communities of OSS and Wikipedia in particular
(de Laat 2007, 2010).
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allowing users to libel and defame others as a side
effect of our open policy. This has caused real dam-
age, to real people, for no other reason than because
it’s on their Wikipedia article. (English user, 2009)
As a corollary, fears are expressed that Wikipedia might
face a lawsuit one day over defamatory content.
As a second preoccupation, many feel strongly that such a
project requires the drawing of boundaries. Vandals should
just not be allowed to participate, they should not be allowed
in. For their purpose, proponents take pains to paint a dark
picture of supposed vandals. They are demonized by depicting
them as ‘‘kleine Vandalen, Spinnern und Witzlern’’, and
comparing them to scrawlers of ‘‘random graffiti’’, spammers,
and virus writers. Censorship at the boundaries is therefore
just as necessary as a spam filter or an anti-virus program—
who could be opposed to that?
When both preoccupations are considered together, pro-
ponents of the review system can be interpreted as har-
bouring a vision of Wikipedia as a proper organization
involved in the business of producing a reliable product—
reliable knowledge in this case. This involves all the asso-
ciated paraphernalia: strict conditions of access, role divi-
sions, processes of quality control, possibly even contributor
control. Correspondingly, the current state of affairs without
a ‘spam filter’ is depicted in dark tones: Wikipedia has all the
features of a playground for juvenile vandals.
Opponents of the review system, on the other hand,
interpret matters in quite a different light. For them it rep-
resents a move in the wrong direction. In their eyes it is not
the continuation of editorial policies in place—it is turning
them upside down. Let me substantiate this claim by briefly
recalling the more fundamental arguments that were raised
by many against the system as bureaucracy-in-the-making
(cf. above). They perceive the bureaucratic rules involved
variously as adding a bureaucratic layer of overseers,
expressing distrust of new contributors, and installing a new
(class) division between experienced and inexperienced
users, between newbies and old-timers. Egalitarianism gives
way to a class system. Such terms indicate a perception of the
new system as a control logic: the newcomers’ discretion is
curtailed, their edits are subject to close control. Wikipedian
editorial policy is perceived as moving towards a syndrome
of lower discretion, with a new division of roles—consisting
of the newly created categories of inexperienced users, users
with rights of auto-review, and users with rights of review—
and a formal system of ‘patrolling’ edits. As one astute user
remarked: the system amounts to a reversal of the burden of
proof. In the old system, new edits were sound until proven
otherwise, in the new system, new edits are suspect until
proven otherwise. As a result, these opponents expect that
newcomers, as they are met with distrust, will be repelled and
apply their energies elsewhere. Many opponents themselves,
as experienced users entitled to participate in these discus-
sions, were so disgusted that at any rate they announced their
own departure.
Against this move towards Weberian bureaucracy (in
the pejorative sense of the term), towards ‘factory disci-
pline’, these proponents try to uphold the egalitarian vision
of Wikipedia as a solidary community—which is the way it
all began. Each is to contribute according to his/her
potential; no one is to be checked or patrolled without a
reason. Boundaries are not to be drawn—everybody is
inside. One proponent phrased this vision of Wikipedia as
primarily a social movement as follows:
It is better to have vandalism than to have ‘‘trusted’’
Wikipedians as gatekeepers. I think that Wikipedia is
not just an online encyclopedia. It is also, perhaps
only to a slight extent, a working place for an
experiment in human social engineering. We actually
shouldn’t be trying to eliminate the inherent diffi-
culties in an encyclopedia that ‘‘anyone can edit.’’ I
think Wikipedia may be ‘‘editing’’ us just as we are
editing Wikipedia, and that is the way it should be.
That is a good thing. I think we should allow this
experiment to run its course. Wikipedia was a bold
idea in its inception and we shouldn’t become timid
simply because we’ve had some ‘‘success.’’ I think
the ‘‘idea’’ is what is worth preserving, not neces-
sarily the body of knowledge. An online encyclope-
dia that anyone can edit is the thing of value, not
necessarily the articles. Sure, we want to preserve the
integrity of the articles. But that is accomplished
through active participation of concerned editors—
not by suspending the experiment and opting for stale
‘‘knowledge.’’ (English user, 2009)
A final question that imposes itself is: what kind of users
voted in support of the new system, and what kind voted
against it? In particular, does experience with editing
Wikipedia matter in this regard? My first inclination was
that it must surely be the ‘veteran’ Wikipedians who
support the review system. They have been around for a
longer time, and had gradually become irritated by the
disturbances emanating from vandalism. To them, the old
days of editing without distinction have become a relic of
the past. Hence they plead for tightening control, because it
enables them to work undisturbed. Their energies may turn
to editing proper. In a similar vein, it could be argued that
since they are long-term participants, they have gradually
come to adopt a typically ‘managerial’ point of view,
which no doubt supports efficiency of the labour process.
And, finally, why would newcomers be enthusiastic about
the introduction of ‘censorship’? Why would editors
without experience be in favour of policing entries?
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Surprisingly, Larry Sanger holds the opposite view
(Sanger 2005). Based on his experience as one the founders
of Nupedia first and Wikipedia later, he maintains that it is
precisely the veterans who oppose any review system
(or system with moderators in general) and try by all means
to uphold the original conception of Wikipedia. Any pro-
posal to introduce rules about content will be branded
censorship. In his view, since Wikipedia started with an
unmoderated, egalitarian conception, those who were there
from the start will stick to it until the end. Precisely
because the Internet is made up of so many unmoderated
[sic]25 communities, he argues, it has become an internal-
ized norm in general. So if some kind of bureaucracy is
deemed to be needed in order to ensure operation within
reasonable bounds, a community should adopt those
bounds from the beginning. Otherwise the door is opened
to perpetual strife.26
Above I have focused exclusively on the arguments
expounded by participants. An intriguing question that
remains to be answered, of course, is: What brought the
three language communities to ultimately choose or reject
such a review system? Why is it that, each in their own
ways, the Germans voted for acceptance, the French for
rejection, while the English have been wavering all the
time between acceptance and rejection? While the age of
the encyclopedia, as a proxy for its stage of development, is
easily ruled out as an explanatory factor—they all started
early in 2001—some other answers suggest themselves
immediately. The English Wikipedia is reportedly more
plagued by vandalism than the two others—recent data
suggest that vandalism percentages for English, French and
German edits are respectively 11.5, 3.5, and 3.5% (West
et al. 2010). Moreover, in a more speculative vein, those
whose mother tongue is German may possibly be more
deferential to hierarchy than those who speak either French
or English, and therefore may prefer the order and
respectability introduced by a system of reviewing. How-
ever, a full analysis to answer these questions properly
would require additional, more sociologically oriented
follow-up research in which questionnaires are sent out to
samples of the participants involved.
Open-content communities: defining the situation
In this final section I want to discuss the implications of the
foregoing analysis for Wikipedia, Wikimedia projects other
than Wikipedia, and open-content communities in general.
To begin with, the analysis can be extended in a straight-
forward fashion to several other Wikipedia-like commu-
nities under the larger umbrella of the Wikimedia
Foundation, all of which operate on the same open-content
principles. Once the software extension for reviewing
(‘FlaggedRevs’) had been composed, the foundation also
made it available to all language versions of all sister-
projects of Wikipedia for implementation (on a voluntary
basis). As a result, the system has actually been spreading
on a wider scale than Wikipedia alone: in particular, it has
diffused to Wikinews, Wikibooks and Wiktionary (http://
meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Flagged_Revisions). Did this
provoke similar discussion and dissent?
Some preliminary answers follow. Wikinews is an online
user-generated journal that started in 2005. Articles are
developed in the ‘newsroom’, by means of a wiki; a selection
of them subsequently appear on the ‘main page’. Similar to
Wikipedia, disruptive editors can be punished by ‘arbitra-
tors’. Reviewing was formally introduced in August 2008 (in
the English version): articles have to be formally checked
according to several news criteria by appointed ‘reviewers’,
before they can be published on the main page. The system
was introduced to guarantee the accuracy of Wikinews’ main
page. As it turned out, it did provoke controversy, along the
same lines of discussion as in Wikipedia, although on a
smaller, less extensive scale. So, just like Wikipedia, Wiki-
news is also an exception to the ‘rule’ of quiet acceptance of
moderation (all information above obtained from http://
en.wikinews.org).27 Remarkably enough, in some other
Wikimedia projects reviewing seems to have been accepted
quietly and has been functioning smoothly ever since 2008:
English Wikibooks (http://en.wikibooks.org) and German
Wiktionary http://de.wiktionary.org).28
On the other hand, the foregoing analysis may be useful
for diagnosing future developments within Wikipedia itself.
The next step on the road of bureaucratisation may soon be
taken. Checking edits for vandalism is one thing; checking
edits (and entries as a whole) for quality proper is another.
Precisely such a more severe check is under consideration, as
part of the drive towards raising the quality of Wikipedian
entries further and thus the reputation of Wikipedia as a
25 As I made clear in my introduction above, I do not share his
diagnosis that Internet communities are predominantly unmoderated.
In my perception, most of them routinely apply some kind of
moderation proper—at least at present.
26 Unfortunately this ‘veteran issue’ cannot be settled easily. User
pages reveal neither enough data, nor in a systematic way, to judge
how long and how actively a user has been involved.
27 At the time or writing, the system is again under discussion among
contributors to English Wikinews, because it is felt that there are too
few actual reviewers and therefore too few articles under develop-
ment reach the main page—those that fail ultimately being deleted.
28 Note that above the introduction of reviewing in some other—
much smaller—language versions of Wikinews/Wiktionary has not
been taken into consideration.
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reliable encyclopedia. ‘Super-reviewers’ (or Pru¨fer in Ger-
man) will be appointed. Such a review will undoubtedly
introduce even more lines of division. Moreover, it will not
only affect inexperienced users but all users across the board.
It may well be that this super-review system will produce an
even larger division of opinions, along the lines sketched out
above. An actual split of the (English) Wikipedian popula-
tion and an exodus of the naysayers cannot be excluded.
Further, the system raises the acute question of who is to be
recruited as super-reviewers: very experienced users from
within Wikipedia, or vetted experts from outside Wikipedia
(cf. also de Laat 2012)? The latter option in particular will not
fail to encounter tough resistance from those who emphasize
the notion of ‘community’ and cling to the original egali-
tarian conception of an encyclopedia-that-anyone-can-edit.
As a final remark, turning to open-content communities
more generally, the ‘organizational’ analysis of bureau-
cratic rules would seem to be useful after all. A control
logic and an enabling logic may have their place in the
analysis, in the following manner. Insofar far as rules (like
those of design, or procedure) foster the exercise of capa-
bilities on the part of employees, their unequivocal inter-
pretation as springing from an enabling logic stands to
reason (just as in organizations). For the classic Weberian
rules that revolve around discretion, however, both logics
would seem to be applicable (unlike the case of organiza-
tions). Users confronted with Weberian bureaucratic rules
for their communities may perceive them in accordance
with either of these logics—depending on their broader
vision of what the community is to stand for. Let me
elaborate this proposition.
If users cling to an egalitarian vision, such rules may
easily be perceived as undermining that vision and there-
fore they are suspect: they are branded as a control logic.
Resistance is especially likely if boundaries and roles are
introduced where none existed before. A ‘factory model’ is
not appreciated. If, however, users basically conceive of
the community as a productive organization, the situation
may be different. Weberian rules that aim to create a more
solid organization from an otherwise amorphous commu-
nity in cyberspace may receive a warm reception. As long
as boundaries are installed in the first place, with insiders
clearly demarcated from outsiders, such rules will be per-
ceived as enabling the performance of a proper community
job. Community members involved applaud the rules as
empowering. Note that the latter interpretation does not
rule out, of course, that additional Weberian rulemaking
inside such community-turned-into-organization, later on,
which directly affects the discretion of some or all mem-
bers, will not be accepted by them, since it is interpreted as
constituting a control logic.
Remarkably, the latter kind of users reveal themselves to
be supporters of bureaucracy, and thereby seem to pull
back from blindly trusting everybody (at least a priori),
falling back instead on an adage formulated at the begin-
ning of the cyber era: ‘Trust needs boundaries’ (Handy
1995). Charles Handy, an organization scientist, famously
argued that for purposes of virtual cooperation one cannot
extend trust to an infinite multitude of largely unknown
people; lines of inclusion/exclusion have to be drawn
somewhere, somehow.
Note that this embrace of Weberian bureaucracy by
users is also at odds with the received wisdom about how
open-content communities supposedly operate—or should
operate. Yochai Benkler coined the term ‘peer production
of knowledge’ (Benkler 2006). In his conception of this
‘mode of production’, quality control by the collective is
high on the agenda (‘self-moderation’)—but appointed
moderators are a bridge too far. Similarly, Axel Bruns
directed our attention to processes of ‘produsage’ (which is
taken to mean the use and production of content inter-
twined) in such communities as Wikipedia and beyond
(Bruns 2008).29 The author emphasizes that a sound
community of hybrid ‘produsers’ needs processes of
‘communal evaluation and filtering’; a ‘stronger recogni-
tion and quantification of individual reputation’ may help
in the process. Nevertheless, specifically entitled modera-
tors—whether operating after or (even) before ‘publica-
tion’—have no proper place in his ‘produsage’ model and
remain conspicuously unmentioned. The principle of
‘equipotentiality’ is to reign, not hierarchy.
In a sense, then, governance rules concerning content
and their contributors present us—and, not unimportantly,
the members of the communities involved themselves—
with a kind of conceptual muddle (Moor 1985): it all
depends on participants’ background convictions how they
will define the situation. From participants in the usual
organization—whether real or virtual—one may broadly
expect a uniform frame of mind on the matter. While
generally averse to such Weberian rule-making, which can
only serve to erode their discretion, they will make an
exception for governance rules insofar as they serve to
define the boundaries of the organization and order the
work-flow in the first place. As organization members they
reason, basically, that any organization needs some mini-
mum amount of Weberian order. The situation is more
complicated for communities with users generating their
own content. More visions of the community than one can
be entertained. Accordingly, the same type of governance
rules—Weberian ones in particular—may elicit praise from
some members (as empowerment) and disapprobation from
other members (as control). Rule making becomes
‘essentially contested’ terrain. It would seem worthwhile to
29 Essentially, Bruns is just rephrasing Benkler’s characterization as
‘peer production of knowledge’.
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explore this conjecture more fully across the wider range of
open-content communities—beyond the particular case of
Wikipedia (and Wikimedia projects generally). Managing
content and disciplining users, tools for guarding the bor-
ders, have turned out to be sensitive areas of virtual com-
munity life after all. Is the same ‘essential contestation’
observed in Wikipedia crystallizing elsewhere? Can more
exceptions to the ‘rule’ of quiet acceptance of moderation
be detected?30
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tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
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